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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A) NATURE OF THE CASE 
This litigation arises out of a January 21, 2006 automobile accident between a vehicle 
owned by Tananda and Kelly Bramlette, operated by Lowell Thompson, and Chris Kiser. As a 
result of the automobile accident, Mr. Kiser sustained physical injuries, incurred a loss of 
income, and his vehicle was rendered a total loss. A claim was made on the Bramlette's Oregon 
Mutual automobile insurance policy for reimbursement for Mr. Kiser's damages. The issue arose 
whether Lowell Thompson, Ms. Tananda Bramlett's boyfriend, had express or implied 
permission to operate the Kelly and Tananda Bramlette's vehicle at the time of the subject 
accident. Oregon Mutual filed a declaratory action to determine its rights and obligations under 
the Bramlette' automobile insurance policy 
B) PROCEEDINGS 
On November 13, 2006, Oregon Mutual Insurance Company filed a Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment against Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, Western 
Community Insurance Company, Chris Kiser and Lowell Thompson. R., p. 7. An Answer to 
Oregon Mutual's Complaint was filed on behalf of Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of 
Idaho, Western Community Insurance Company, and Chris Kiser on December 6, 2006. R., p. 
97. Lowell Thompson failed to appear in this case, and a default judgment was ultimately 
entered against him. R., p. 3. The default judgment as entered by the District Court, pertained 
only to Oregon Mutual's obligation to defend, indemnify or provide coverage for Lowell 
Thompson. 
Following the entry of the default judgment, Oregon Mutual filed for Summary 
Judgment. R., p. 103. Oregon Mutual was seeking an order from the District Court decreeing that 
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Mr. Kiser did not have an imputed negligence claim against Kelly and Tananda Bramlette 
pursuant to LC. §49-2417 because Lowell Thompson did not have permission to operate the 
Bramlette vehicle. R., p. 106. The District Court denied Oregon Mutual's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the basis that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding coverage. R. p. 143. 
The District Comt ruled that the Default Judgment against Lowell Thompson did not preclude 
Chris Kiser from fully litigating the issue of coverage. 
On January 7, 2008, the case was tried before the District Court. At the conclusion of the 
evidence, the parties were invited to file written closing arguments. R., pp., 158, 175,183. The 
District Court issued its Trial Decision on February 26, 2008. R., p. 192. The District Court 
found that at the time of the accident Lowell Thompson was driving with the permission of co-
owner Tananda Bramlette. 
C) STATEMENTOFTHEFACTS 
This litigation arises out of a January 21, 2006 automobile accident between Defendants 
Lowell Thompson and Chris Kiser. At the time of the accident, Mr. Thompson was operating a 
1989 Toyota Celica owned by Tananda and Kelly Bramlette. Tr. p. 11, 11 18 23; p. 40, 116 10. 
Lowell Thompson was Tananda's boyfriend and ultimately became the father ofTananda's baby. 
Tr. p. 12, 11.24 - 25; Tr. p. 83, 11. 16- 18. Tananda and Mr. Thompson began living together in 
October of 2005, and continued to do so after the accident. Tr. p. 79, 11. 6 - 26; p. 80, 11. 1- 25; p. 
81, 11. 1- 25. 
In January of 2006, Mr. Thompson installed a new motor in the 1989 Toyota Celica. Tr. 
p. 49, 1118 - 20. Mr. Thompson had keys to the Celica while he worked on the vehicle. Tr. p. 
85, 11. 4- 5. After the engine had been installed, the vehicle required a tune-up. Anangements 
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were made to take the 1989 Toyota Celica to Al Holl Tire Center for the tune up. Tr. p. 51, 11. 22 
- 23 
On the day of the accident, January 21, 2006, Mr. Thompson, started the Celica. 
Tananda thereafter drove the vehicle and Mr. Thompson to Al Holl's Tire Center, Mr. 
Thompson's place of employment. Tr. p. 85, ll. 6 - 8; p. 88, ll. 1- 2. Tananda was working that 
day at Walmmt from 11:00 a.m. - 8:00 p.m. Tr. p. 48, 11. 19 - 21. After Tananda dropped the 
Celica off at Al Holl's Tire Center, Tananda left her cell phone with Lowell Thompson and was 
driven to work by an employee of Al Holl's Tire Center. Tr. p. 92, 11. 3 - 5. Arrangements were 
made for Tananda to be picked up from work by an Al Holl's Tire Center employee when her 
shift was over at 8:00 p.m. Tr. p. 95, 11. 19 - 25. Tananda did not give any instructions that 
Lowell Thompson could not drive the Celica. Tr. p. 107, 11. 1- 10. 
After the repairs on the subject vehicle were complete, Al Holl gave Mr. Thompson the 
keys to the vehicle so Mr. Thompson could drive the vehicle to Ms. Bramlette's place of 
employment. Transcript from Deposition of Lowell Thompson, R. p. 205, Transcript of 
Deposition of Lowell Anthony Thompson, dated March 15, 2007, p. 11, ll.14 - 19. Upon .Mr. 
Thompson's arrival at Ms. Bramlette's place of employment, Ms. Bramlette was outside taking 
her break. R. p. 205, Transcript of Deposition of Lowell Anthony Thompson, dated March 15, 
2007, p. 12, 11 7n- 12; p. 45, 11. 9 - 11. Ms. Bramlette observed that Mr. Thompson was driving 
her vehicle and then instructed him to drive her vehicle from her place of employment to obtain 
gas. R. p. 205, Transcript of Deposition of Lowell Anthony Thompson, dated March 15, 2007, 
p. 12 11. 10 - 12; p. 45, 11. 17 - 19. After Mr. Thompson did so, Mr. Thompson began to drive 
the subject vehicle to Sand Hollow to check on his vehicle which had been left on the side of the 
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road. The subject accident took place enroute to Sand Hollow. R. p. 205, Transcript of 
Deposition of Lowell Anthony Thompson, dated March 15, 2007, p. 13, 11. 18- 25. 
Mr. Kiser was stopped in traffic on Highway 44 waiting to execute a left hand turn into 
his driveway. Mr. Kiser activated his turn signal, waited for oncoming traffic to pass, and began 
to execute his turn. Defendant Thompson then attempted to overtake Defendant Kiser's vehicle 
and collided with the driver's side of Defendant Kiser's vehicle. Defendant Thompson was under 
the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. R., p. 205, Exhibit l.; Deposition of Lowell 
Anthony Thompson, dated March 15, 2007, pp. 13, 14, 24. Mr. Kiser sustained physical injuries, 
incurred a loss of income, and his vehicle was rendered a total loss as a result of the accident. 
Tr., p. 136, 11. 14 - 25. 
As a result of the accident, Mr. Thompson was cited for driving under the influence of 
alcohol, driving without privileges and driving without insurance Tr. p. 82 11. 1 - 6. Mr. Kiser 
was never advised by Mr. Thompson or the Bramlettes that there was no insurance for the 
incident Tr. p. 138, ll. 1 - 10. After the accident, the investigating officer, Deputy Jim Brown, 
received a telephone call from Tananda Bramlette advised the officer that there was insurance for 
the vehicle. Ms. Bramlette did not assert to the officer that Mr. Thompson did not have 
permission to drive the vehicle. The prosecutor did not go forward on the insurance citation. p. 
78, 11. 18 25 p. 79, 11. 1 - 2 
IL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A) Whether the District Court Erred in Ruling That the Default Judgment Entered Against 
Lowell Thompson Did Not Preclude Chris Kiser From Fully Litigating the Coverage 
Issue 
B) Whether the District Court Erred in Determining That Lowell Thompson Was Driving 
With the Permission of Tananda Bramlette at the Time of the Subject Accident. 
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C) Whether Respondent is entitled to costs and Attorney fees on Appeal. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A) Standard of Review 
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are questions of law, which this Court will freely 
review. Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312,320, 78 P.3d 379,387 (2003). 
The issue of permission, however, is a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact. 
Allied Group Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 123 Idaho 733, 852 P.2d 485 (Idaho 1993), citing 
Steele v. Nagel, 89 Idaho 522, 530-31, 406 P.2d 805, 809-10 (1965). This Court will set aside a 
trial court's findings only if they are clearly erroneous. LR.C.P. 52(a); McCray v. Rosenkrance, 
135 Idaho 509, 513, 20 P.3d 693, 697 (2001); In re Williamson v. City of McCall, 135 Idaho 
452, 454, 19 P.3d 766, 768 (2001). To decide whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this 
Court must determine whether the findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence. In 
re Williamson at 454, 19 P.3d at 768. Evidence is substantial and competent if a reasonable trier 
of fact would accept it and rely on it. Id. Findings based on substantial, competent evidence, 
even if conflicting, will not be disturbed on appeal. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 
P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002). Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 78 P.3d 389 (2003). 
B) The District Court's Ruling That The Default Judgment Entered Against Lowell 
Thompson Did Not Preclude Chris Kiser From Fully· Litigating the Coverage is 
Consistent With Idaho Law 
Appellant brought suit against Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, 
Western Community Insurance Company, Chris Kiser and Lowell Thompson. Farm Bureau 
Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, Western Community Insurance Company, and Chris Kiser 
filed an answer to the complaint. Lowell Thompson, however, failed to appear. Appellant 
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submitted a proposed Default Judgment which included language that affected the legal rights of 
both Lowell Thompson and Chris Kiser. As Chris Kiser had filed an Answer to Appellant's 
Complaint, the District Court modified the proposed default judgment and redacted the language 
that applied to Chris Kiser. The Default Judgment that was ultimately entered in the underlying 
case reads in part as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
Defendant Lowell Thompson did not have permission, express or implied, to 
drive the vehicle, and, as such, the Policy does not require Oregon Mutual to 
defend, indemnify or otherwise provide coverage for Defendant Lowell 
Thompson for all claims arising out of the January 21, 2006 accident; 
Based on the language of the judgment, it is clear that the Default Judgment was only to apply to 
Defendant Lowell Thompson, and not the remaining Defendants. 
Appellant's then moved for summary judgment. One of the issues presented to the 
District Court was whether the remaining Defendants could litigate the issue of permission given 
The entry of the default judgment against Mr. Thompson. The District Court ruled, in part, as 
follows: 
Farm Bureau never had the opportunity to fully litigate the issue of whether Mr. 
Thompson was a covered driver under the Policy. Accordingly, the Court is 
unwilling to hold the default judgment to preclude Farm Bureau from presenting 
fully its case. Thus, the Court, in its discretion finds that Fa1m Bureau is not 
collaterally stopped from raising the issue of Mr Thompson's coverage. 
The district Court's ruling is consistent with Idaho Law. "Res judicata is an affirmative 
defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements by a preponderance of 
the evidence." Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 122, 157 P.3d at 616 (citing Foster v. City of St. 
Anthony, 122 Idaho 883, 890, 841 P.2d 413,420 (1992)). 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, may be applied to prior judgments, estopping a 
person from arguing a finding or verdict that has already been rendered. Anderson v. City of 
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Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 183, 731 P.2d 171, 177 (1986). The test of when collateral estoppel 
should apply is (1) whether the pa1ty had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, (2) 
whether the issue decided in the previous litigation is identical to the current issue presented, (3) 
whether the issue was actually decided in the previous litigation and whether the issue was 
necessary to the prior judgment, ( 4) whether the final judgment was on the merits and ( 5) 
whether the party who the judgment is asserted against was a party or in privity with the party to 
the prior judgment. Anderson, 112 Idaho at 183-184, 731 P.2d at 177-179 (citations omitted). 
Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882, 173 P. 3d 1141 (2007). Moreover, the party seeking to bind 
another by a prior judgment has the burden of proving that the requirements of collateral 
estoppel have been met. > Peters v. Missouri-Pacific Railroad Co., 483 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied > 414 U.S. 1002, 94 S.Ct. 356, 38 L.Ed.2d 238 (1973); > United States v. 
Friedland, 391 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1968) cert. denied> 404 U.S. 867, 914, 92 S.Ct. 143, 239, 30 
L.Ed.2d 111, 188 (1971); > State ex rel. Turk v. District Court, 581 P.2d 433 (Mont.1978); > 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Century Home Components, Inc., 275 Or. 97, 550 P.2d 1185 
(1976). 
Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783,621 P. 2d 399 (1980). 
In the present case, not all of the elements of when collateral estoppels apply have been 
met. The issue of permission was not litigated. In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to 
apply, the issue in question must have actually been litigated and resolved in the prior suit. See 
Duff v. Draper, 96 Idaho 299, 527 P.2d 1257 (1974); lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE P 
0.443(5) (2d ed. 1965). Cf Green v. Gough, 96 Idaho 927, 539 P.2d 280 (1975); Gaige v. City 
of Boise, 91 Idaho 481, 425 P.2d 52 (1967); Intermountain Food Equipment Co. v. Waller, 86 
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Idaho 94,383 P.2d 612 (1963); (cited opinions apply a similar rule to cases involving doctrine of 
res judicata ). 
Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783,621 P. 2d 399 (1980). 
Appellant cites Waller v. State of Idaho to Appellant in support of its proposition that the 
District Court erred with respect to the issue of collateral estoppel. Waller, however, does not 
apply in this case. The facts of Waller are distinguishable from those of the present case before 
the Comt. Waller is a recent case in which Appellant sought relief from a default judgment 
entered eleven years earlier. The District Court dismissed Waller's complaint and Waller 
appealed. State of Idaho brought suit against Waller for reimbursement of benefits and to 
establish support obligation for a non biological child. Waller failed to answer the complaint and 
a default judgment was entered against Waller in 1995. In 2004 Waller filed for divorce decree 
entered by stipulation stated no financial obligation for support. Waller moved to set aside 
default judgment, and the custodial caretaker of minor child stipulated to the motion. The 
District Court denied the motion as not being timely. The decision was not appealed. Waller 
brought an action to have his support obligation removed. State filed a motion to dismiss on the 
basis that the claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Waller appealed the dismissal and 
asserted that he did not have full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Waller's argument was 
rejected on the basis that he did not file an answer or raise any defenses in prior litigation. 
In the present case, the Default Judgment was not entered against Respondents. 
Furthermore, unlike in the Waller case, Respondents filed an answer and asserted defenses. 
Therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to this case. 
C) The District Court Acted Within the of Boundaries of its Discretion and Consistent with 
Legal Standards and Reached its Discretion by an Exercise of Reason 
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The issue of permission, however, is a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact. 
Allied Group Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 123 Idaho 733, 852 P.2d 485 (Idaho 1993), citing 
Steele v. Nagel, 89 Idaho 522, 530-31, 406 P.2d 805, 809-10 (1965). This Court will set aside a 
trial court's findings only if they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); McCray v. Rosenkrance, 
135 Idaho 509, 513, 20 P.3d 693, 697 (2001); In re Williamson v. City of McCall, 135 Idaho 
452,454, 19 P.3d 766, 768 (2001). To decide whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this 
Comt must determine whether the findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence. In 
re Williamson at 454, 19 P.3d at 768. Evidence is substantial and competent if a reasonable trier 
of fact would accept it and rely on it. Id. Findings based on substantial, competent evidence, 
even if conflicting, will not be disturbed on appeal. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 
P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002). Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 78 P.3d 389 (2003). 
The evidence in the subject case supports the District Court's finding of permissive use. 
There are facts regarding both implied and express permission. Tananda Bramlette brought her 
vehicle to Al Holl's Tire Center for repairs. Tananda entrusted her keys to Al Holl's Tire Center 
with the expectation that one of the employees would pick her up from work. Lowell Thompson 
had been working at Al Holl's Tire Center for several weeks before accident. The owner of the 
repair shop, Mr. Thompson's employer, Al Holl, delegated task of picking up Tananda to his 
employee Mr. Thompson when he gave him the keys to the subject vehicle. Tananda Bramlette Tr. 
Trans. p. 56, 11. 6 - 14. 
The subject vehicle was owned by Tananda and Kelly Bramlette. Tananda's father, Dale, 
was not an owner of the vehicle. Tr. Trans. p. 104, 11. 1 - 6. Tananda admitted in her testimony that 
she did not instruct Al Holl's Tire Center that Lowell Thompson was prohibited from driving her 
vehicle. Given the fact that Tananda's shift at Wal-Mart did not end until 8:00 p.m., after Al Holl's 
Tire Center was closed, who does it make the most sense to delegate the task of picking up Tananda 
to, but Lowell Thompson, Al Holl' s Tire Center employee and Tananda' s live in boyfriend. 
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When Mr. Thompson arrived at Tananda's place of employment driving her vehicle, 
Tananda Bramlette did not object or inquire as to why Mr. Thompson was driving her vehicle. 
Instead, Tananda requested that Mr. Thompson to purchase gasoline for the vehicle. Tananda did 
not instruct Mr. Thompson where he was to purchase the gasoline. After Mr. Thompson did so, Mr. 
Thompson began to drive the subject vehicle to Sand Hollow to check on his vehicle which had 
been left on the side of the road. 
Mr. Thompson was given express permission to drive the subject vehicle on at least two 
occasions on the night of the subject accident. Mr. Thompson was given express permission to 
drive the subject vehicle when Al Holl delegated the task of picking Tananda up from work and 
gave Mr. Thompson the keys. Mr. Thompson was also given express permission to drive the 
subject vehicle when Tananda asked Mr. Thompson to drive her vehicle to a gas station and fill it up 
with gasoline. 
Mr. Thompson also had implied permission to operate the subject vehicle. There are several 
factors to consider when determining implied permission. 
There is the relationship of the owner and the driver. Other factors to be considered include 
the following: 
(1) whether the driver had been given permission to drive the vehicle in the past; (2) did the 
driver have easy access to the keys; (3) did the owner check the gas, oil, or mileage to see 
whether. the vehicle was being used without permission; ( 4) had the drive been instructed 
not to drive the vehicle; ( 5) what action did the owner take when the car was missing; and, 
(6) did the driver have express permission to use another vehicle belonging to the owner. 
Prior to the subject accident, Lowell Thompson was Tananda's boyfriend and a member of 
her household. p. 16, 11. 1 - 6. In fact, Mr. Thompson is the father of Ms. Brarnlette's baby. 
The relaiionship of the owner and operator is an important factor in determining the issue of 
permission. Allied Group Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 123 Idaho 733, 852 P.2d 485 (1993). In the 
present case, the owner of the vehicle, Tananda Bramlette, and the operator, Lowell Thompson, 
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were not just acquaintances or strangers; they were romantically involved and living in the same 
household. 
The Court has dealt with the issue of express and implied permission in situations involving 
family members. The Court reasoned that: 
the word 'permission' as used in the statutes and automobile insurance policies 
means general permission to at least occasionally use a family vehicle. Precise 
permission to do what the driver is doing at the precise moment of the accident is 
unnecessary. 
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Hmelevsky, 97 Idaho 46, 539 P.2d 598 
(1975). 
Although Plaintiff Tananda Bramlette and Defendant Thompson are not related by blood or 
marriage, they were romantically involved and sharing the same household. As such, Defendant 
would assert that Defendant Thompson was given permission to operate the subject vehicle and that 
it was not necessary for him to be operation the vehicle as instructed by Ms. Bramlette at the exact 
moment of the accident. It is Defendants' contention that Defendant Thompson had both express 
and implied permission to operate Plaintiffs' vehicle at the time of the subject accident. 
Lowell Thompson had access to the keys to the subject vehicle. During the trial, Tananda 
testified that Mr. Thompson had a key to the car. In fact, Mr. Thompson was the one who staited 
the cai· on the morning the car was driven to Al Hall's Tire. Tr. Trans. p. 83, 11. 1- 10. 
Mr. Thompson also had access to the keys of the subject car as an employee of Al Hall's 
Tire Center. Tananda did not restrict Mr. Thompson's access to the keys by personally instructing 
Al Holl' s Tire Center that Mr. Thompson was prohibited from driving her vehicle. 
In the present case, there has been no testimony to indicate that Tananda or Mrs. Bramlette 
checked the gas, oil, or mileage to see whether the vehicle was being used without permission. In 
fact, Tananda testified quite the opposite. It is Tananda's testimony that Mr. Thompson did 
contribute to the gasoline in her vehicle. Tr. Trans. p. 65, 11. 11 - 13 Further, Mr. Thompson was 
the person who installed the entire engine including oils and engine parts Tr. Trans p. 82, 11. 22-25 
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According to the testimony of Tananda, Tananda and Mrs. Bramlette were the owners of the 
subject vehicle. Tananda was the primary driver of the vehicle. Tananda never discussed with Mr. 
Thompson that he was not to drive the subject vehicle. Tr. Trans. p 104, IL 1 - 6 
Mrs. Bramlette adinits during her testimony that she does not know whether or not Tananda 
gave Mr. Thompson pennission to drive the subject vehicle. According to Mrs. Bramlette, "what 
kids do, I don't know." Tr. Trans. p. 28 IL 1 -16 
The actions of the Bramlettes after the accident do not support the proposition that Lowell 
Thompson was driving the subject vehicle without pennission. Neither Tananda nor Mrs. Bramlette 
reported the vehicle as stolen. In fact, Mr. Thompson was invited to reside at the Bramlette home 
after the accident. Tr. Trans. pp. 106 - 107; II 23 - 25, IL 1 - 6 Situation permitting, Tananda also 
continued to allow Mr. Thompson to drive vehicles owned by the Bramlettes. Tr. Trans p. 99, II. 3 
- 6; p. 106, II. 13 - 19. 
After the incident Tananda gave Mr. Thompson her insurance card for the subject vehicle. 
Tr. Trans p. 76, II. 18 - 25. Deputy Jim Brown testified at trial that Tananda contacted him to 
advise that there was insurance on the vehicle. As a result of that conversation the citation for 
failure to show proof of insurance was dismissed by the prosecutor. Tr. Trans. pp. 121- 122, II 13 -
25, 1 - 25. Furthennore, Mr. Kiser was not contacted by Mr. Thompson or the Bramlettes to advise 
that there was no insurance for the subject vehicle. It appeared at trial that Mrs. Bramlette was 
functioning under a misconception concerning insurance coverage. She assumed that unless a 
person is designated in the declaration of the policy there was no coverage. She appeared confused 
on the issue of others being insured as casual drivers. In fact she was concerned about personal 
financial loss from Mr. Thompson driving. 
During the course of the trial, Tananda admitted that she gave Mr. Thompson permission to 
drive her 1989 Toyota Celica. Tr. Trans. p. 39, 11 23 - 25; p. 40, I 1. One occasion was in October 
of 2005, and then again in December of 2005. Tr. Tans. p. 40, II 12 - 21. Tananda also adinitted 
that Mr. Thompson was given pennission to driver vehicles she owned after the subject accident. 
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Q. Okay. And after the accident, you continued to let Mr. Thompson drive vehicles 
owned by you, didn't you. 
A. Situation permitting. 
p.99,11.3-6 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
A) Whether Respondent is entitled to Costs and Attorneys Fees on Appeal. 
On appeal Respondent seeks costs according to Idaho Appellate Rule 40. Appellant also 
seeks attorney fees on Appeal. Attorney fees on Appeal are appropriate when the court is left: 
[W]ith the abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, 
umeasonable, or without foundation 
Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 789 P.2d 634 (1990). Also Idaho Code, Section 12-121, Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) and Idaho Appellant Rule 41. 
In the case at hand the Court informed Appellant that there request to bind Farm Bureau by 
a default as against a separate and adverse party was not allowed under the Court's reading of Idaho 
law. The Court's ruling andldaho case law leave little room for debate on Appellant's Motion. 
In addition, Appellant recognizes that the standard of review on factual findings is such that 
an appeal as to the Court's findings of fact in the underlying case cannot be disturbed on Appeal. 
There was substantial competent evidence that the Court heard before rending a decision. Further 
the Court often questioned witnesses to clarify any dispute in the facts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As the District Court noted in its Summary Judgment Ruling Farm Bureau as insurer for 
Mr. Kiser never had the opportunity to fully litigate the issue of permissive use of Mr. Thompson 
as it applies to owner's liability that would attach to the Bramletts. Further the decision on the 
default judgment was procedural in nature rather than substantive and the merits of permissive 
verses non permissive use was not litigated. In addition, Farm Bureau and Mr. Kiser are not in 
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privily with Mr. Thompson against whom the default was taken. In other words, the test as cited 
in Anderson v. City of Pocate[[o requires a finding that the default is not binding upon Farm 
Bureau and Mr. Kiser since three of the five elements are not met. 
With respect to the issue of permissive use the Court had the opportunity of hearing live 
testimony also reading deposition testimony submitted by the parties. The Court could find the 
obvious discrepancies as between Tananda Bramlette's deposition testimony and her Trial 
testimony. Tananda Bramlette created significant amounts of conflicting testimony. The Court 
then needed to properly evaluate the testimony in conjunction with the other testimony in the 
case. The finding that there was permissive use for Mr. Thompson to drive the Bramlette vehicle 
is support with significant, substantial, and in a number of areas persistent repetitive testimony. 
The Court's factual findings after listening and reading the appropriate testimony should not be 
disturbed on Appellate review. The findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, in reality the 
Court's findings are consistent with the authority of the evidence submit at trial. 
Respondent therefore, respectfully requests that the Court up hold the District Court's 
decision in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this 3 day of October 2008. 
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